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Mixing-and-Matching Across (Legal) Family Lines 
J. Mark Ramseyer 
ABSTRACT 
“Legal origins” scholars explain economic performance by a 
country’s membership in a given “legal family.” To demonstrate the 
proposition, they regress various indices of performance on, inter alia, 
that membership. 
These regressions are properly specified only if (a) countries cannot 
switch families, and (b) family membership seriously constrains legal 
change. If countries can switch, then family membership is endogenous 
to economic performance—since a country will decide whether to stay in 
a family with an eye to its expected economic effect. If countries can 
readily borrow across legal family lines, then membership does not 
bind—and necessarily can have no effect on performance. 
Unfortunately, neither of these propositions is true. Countries can 
indeed switch and borrow—easily. That one does not observe much cross-
family switching or borrowing in practice merely reflects the fact—
nicely demonstrated by Spamann—that countries find it easier to 
borrow from other countries that use the same language, and that legal 
families tend to correlate with linguistic families. Given that statutory 
options within any one legal family usually offer countries all the 
options they need, countries have little reason to move outside those 
linguistic groups. 
I illustrate the possibility of cross-family switching and borrowing 
with the example of pre-war Japan. 
I. THE CAUSES OF GROWTH 
Economies thrive (or not) for a variety of reasons. They thrive 
when governments keep trading markets operational, and define and 
enforce rights to scarce resources. But they also thrive when workers 
bring a basic education to their jobs, when firms can exploit a well-
 
  Mitsubishi Professor of Japanese Legal Studies, Harvard University. In assembling 
these comments, I benefited greatly from conversations with Mark Roe, and comments from 
Tom Ginsburg, Curtis Milhaupt, and Mark Roe. Holger Spamann graciously saved me from 
many errors with his patient and generous suggestions to multiple drafts of this article. 
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developed transportation network, and when entrepreneurs with 
good projects have ready access to capital. 
Some of these “causes” of economic performance are also its 
“result.” Put otherwise, many of the causes are endogenous to the 
performance itself. Economies may grow faster when workers bring a 
basic education, but rich societies choose to invest more heavily in 
education than poor. They may grow faster where firms can rent 
sophisticated transportation services, but rich societies choose to 
build more elaborate transportation networks than poor. They may 
grow faster when entrepreneurs can tap capital readily, but rich 
societies offer more elaborate financial services than poor. 
Unfortunately for scholars, this two-way causation stymies 
academic proof. Traditionally, we have explored whether factors A1 
and A2 (the independent variables) cause outcome B (the dependent 
variable) by regressing B on A1 and A2 through ordinary least 
squares. We can properly do so, though, only when A1 and A2 are 
not endogenous to the purported effect B. If B also causes A1 and A2, 
we cannot tell by running ordinary least squares. Education may 
contribute to economic performance, but we cannot test the 
proposition by regressing performance on education. Transportation 
and financial services may enhance performance, too, but we cannot 
regress economic performance on either. 
At times, scholars can find econometric ways around this 
endogeneity. If we can identify a third variable that causes A1 but is 
not itself a function of B, we can run the regression with 
“instrumental variables.” Yet good instruments are hard to find. 
Fame may go to scholars who can demonstrate causation 
unambiguously. But in the field of economic growth, that 
demonstration has proven maddeningly elusive. 
II. LEGAL ORIGINS AND THE STRUCTURAL THEORY 
Enter the “legal origins” team, a shifting coalition of Simeon 
Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei 
Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishney, with occasional appearances from 
others.1 Countries picked their legal systems decades ago, they 
 
 1. A recent iteration that presents itself as a summary but in fact differs from past 
articles in significant ways is Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 
The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008). This legal origins 
literature is massive, and something of a moving target. In one of the more recent iterations, 
for example, the authors write that they “adopt a broad conception of legal origin as a style of 
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reason, sometimes centuries ago. For the most part, the countries 
did not pick their systems with an eye toward their effect on 
economic performance. Instead, most found the family thrust upon 
them by their colonizer. 
What is more, continues the “legal origins” team, this initial 
choice decisively constrained the country’s later legal options. If a 
country initially adopted the French legal system, it could not readily 
switch to an Anglo-American regime. Neither could it readily adopt 
legislative solutions developed in an Anglo-American country. 
The econometric possibilities follow straightforwardly. If (a) a 
country chose its legal family at the outset without an eye on its 
economic effect, and (b) that choice constrained the range of legal 
measures it could later adopt, then (c) the country’s legal family (i) 
potentially mattered, and (ii) was exogenous. Scholars could indeed 
regress economic variables on a country’s legal family membership. 
Crucially, however, scholars can properly run these regressions 
only if both statements (a) and (b) are true. Suppose that countries 
choose their legal family with an eye toward its economic effect. 
When the Japanese government reformed its legal system in the late 
nineteenth century, for example, it did so explicitly as part of a 
campaign to build a “rich country with a strong military.”2 If 
countries choose their legal family with economic effects in mind, 
then the choice is indeed endogenous. Scholars cannot properly 
regress economic outcomes on the initial choice.3 
But of course not all countries aped Japan. Those that began as 
colonies could not have chosen their legal families with expected 
 
social control of economic life (and maybe of other aspects of life as well).” Id. at 286. At that 
level, the authors would seem to be reintroducing the debates among sociologists and 
anthropologists in the 1950s and 1960s over “national cultures” and national “cultural styles.” 
Distinctive national cultures may or may not exist, and, if they do exist, may or may not affect 
patterns of economic growth. But the inquiry into cultural styles is a fundamentally different 
inquiry from whether growth patterns are affected by having the Napoleonic code, the Prussian 
code, or the U.C.C. In this Article, I use the term “legal family” as lawyers and legal scholars 
have long understood it: to refer to the character of laws in place. By this long-established 
tradition, if a country has a close variation on a set of German civil, criminal, and procedural 
codes, it is a member of the German legal family. If it has a variation on a set of French codes, 
it is in the French legal family. I do not discuss any national cultural styles (if there are any) or 
languages that might (or might not) correlate with legal family membership. 
 2. JOHN K. FAIRBANK, EDWIN O. REISCHAUER & ALBERT M. CRAIG, EAST ASIA: THE 
MODERN TRANSFORMATION 229 (2004). 
 3. The endogeneity point is developed elsewhere as well. See generally, e.g., CURTIS J. 
MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM (2008). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/3/2010 7:31 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1704 
economic performance in mind. They did not choose their legal 
families at all. Rather, the colonial powers simply imposed the family 
on them, and imposed what they knew best. If the colonial powers 
designed their own legal systems with expected economic 
performance in mind, the imposition might still be endogenous to 
that performance. But table the objection—perhaps the connection 
is sufficiently weak. 
Or suppose a country’s initial legal family choice does not 
constrain current legal policy. For example, suppose first that a 
country can switch legal families. Granted, a country may have made 
its initial legal family choice without regard to its economic 
consequences. But by the second half of the 20th century, virtually 
all countries passed statutes with their likely economic consequences 
in mind. If a country were now to switch families, it would be 
switching with an eye to expected economic performance. If it could 
switch families but did not, then its decision not to switch would 
itself be endogenous: it does not switch only because it believes that 
its current family promotes desirable economic outcomes as 
effectively as any alternative. 
Suppose second that a country can readily adopt legal measures 
from countries in other legal families.4 Suppose, in other words, that 
legal family membership does not seriously constrain current legal 
policy. If it does not constrain, it necessarily has no effect—and 
logically cannot affect economic performance. Although the legal 
origins team concedes  that “[o]ccasionally, countries adopt some 
laws from one legal tradition and other laws from another,” it insists 
that cross-family borrowing is exceptional. For their regressions to 
mean anything, it must be so.5 If legal family membership does not 
constrain but a regression on legal family yields a significant 
coefficient anyway, that coefficient must—necessarily—capture the 
effect of some omitted variable.6 
 
 4. This point has been nicely made by a wide variety of scholars. See, e.g., MILHAUPT & 
PISTOR, supra note 3. This is also key to Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock 
Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460 (2006), and John Armour, Simon Deakin, Priya Lele & 
Mathias Siems, How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison of 
Shareholder, Creditor, and Worker Protection, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 579 (2009). 
 5. La Porta et al., supra note 1, at 288. 
 6. The irrelevance of the legal variables used by the “legal origins” team is discussed 
carefully and at length in, e.g., Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of 
La Porta et al.’s ‘Anti-Director Rights Index’ under Consistent Coding (European Corporate 
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 67, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
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III. SPAMANN 
Holger Spamann asks why legal systems change in the directions 
that they do.7 Rather than characterize legal families as largely 
immutable, he recognizes that laws change. Despite this change, 
however, he properly notes that contemporary countries within a 
given family still tend to resemble each other. They need not 
resemble each other because of anything inherent in the original 
codes, he writes.8 Perhaps instead they resemble each other because 
they have changed together—because the changes themselves have 
followed family lines: “[S]ubstantive differences between countries of 
different families around the world,” explains Spamann, are “the 
result of separate diffusion processes rather than of intrinsic 
differences between common and civil law.”9 
Two countries in the French legal family may maintain similar 
legal systems, in other words, but perhaps they do not do so because 
the French imposed similar codes at the outset. That happened 
decades ago, and both countries have changed their laws many times 
since. Rather, perhaps they maintain similar systems because—since 
adopting the original codes—both countries have copied France. 
What is more, continues Spamann, they do not both copy France 
because no other laws would fit with the original French codes. They 
copy France because they read French.10 
More specifically, Spamann first observes that legal developments 
within a legal family tend to correlate. Legal scholars in the former 
French colonies cite French scholars rather than German or English. 
Legislators in the former French colonies copy French statutes rather 
than German or English. Judges in the former French colonies 
mimic French judges rather than German or English.11 
 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=894301; Mark J. Roe & Jordan I. Siegel, Finance and Politics: A 
Review Essay Based on Kenneth Dam’s Analysis of Legal Traditions in the Law-Growth Nexus, 47 
J. ECON. LITERATURE 781 (2009); KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE 
RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2006). 
 7. See Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the 
Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1813, 1815. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 1813. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See id. at 1837–44 (describing data on diffusion within French legal family). 
Presumably, the countries also stay within their legal families because the firms with which they 
trade most frequently come from the same traditions and would find the laws most familiar. 
This, however, seems not to be a major part of the debate. 
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Scholars, legislators, and judges do this, Spamann argues, in part 
simply for linguistic convenience.12 Those in the former French 
colonies follow Paris because they read the French language. They 
read French because they or their professors studied at French 
universities. And they learned French and studied in France 
because—relationship-specific investments being what they are—
their domestic firms disproportionately trade with France and other 
former French colonies.13 
At least impliedly, perhaps legal family membership itself (as 
opposed to the language with which it is correlated) just does not 
matter. Scholars in the former French colonies could read German 
scholars or French scholars, and could profitably learn from either. 
They stick with the latter because they read French easily—because 
of linguistically-driven positive switching costs. They could learn 
German and read the German scholars, but why bother? Given that 
the French scholars suit their purposes adequately, any marginal 
gains would be modest at best.14 Legislators in the former French 
colonies could borrow regulatory statutes from Germany too, but, 
again, why bother? French statutes serve just as well.15 Much the 
same logic explains why judges cite French rather than German 
cases.16 
 
 12. See id. at 1852. 
 13. See id. at 1855. 
 14. The marginal (not absolute) costs of moving across legal family lines obviously do 
depend on the language used in the home country. A Japanese scholar who hopes to adopt a 
French provision will need to learn French—but would need to learn German if he wanted to 
borrow a German provision instead. A scholar in a former German colony would already know 
German. The gains (whether marginal or absolute) from moving across legal family lines, 
however, should not vary. If a country has a German Civil Code, the potential gains to 
adopting a French-style legal measure do not depend on whether the citizens in the country do 
or do not speak German. 
 15. There are multiple ways to solve most of the more common legal problems: statutes, 
administrative regulations, common law—usually, one can reach an answer from any of these 
approaches. For the proposition that a country adopts one approach rather than another 
because of its political history, see Roe, supra note 4.  
 16. Spamann suggests that the tendency for legal changes to diffuse within family lines 
leads to substantive differences within families. Spamann, supra note 7, at 1819–20. Spamann 
theorizes at some length about why this tendency could occur: “From the point of view of 
rational actor models used in economics and political science, it may seem puzzling why 
countries would cling to models of their legal family rather than make a conscious decision of a 
suitable normative model.” Id. at 1862. He then speculates about externalities, collective 
action problems, and path dependence. Id. at 1863–64. In fact, the purported externalities and 
collective action problems seem implausible: leaders in autocratic governments internalize 
much of what would otherwise be externalities, and politicians in democracies face competitive 
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If family membership does not seriously constrain the legal (or 
other) choices a country makes, then legal family membership 
itself—the basic legal codes in place—cannot logically affect observed 
economic performance. If performance is correlated with family 
membership, that must reflect other variables tied to the country’s 
initial colonization. France colonized one group of countries, and 
administered them in one way; Germany colonized a very different 
set and administered them differently; and England followed yet 
another path. Legal family membership correlates with these 
colonization patterns and—because it does so—with a wide variety 
of other institutional characteristics besides. To the extent that those 
other characteristics influence economic performance, any regression 
of performance on legal family that omits those characteristics will 
generate significant coefficients on the family variable.17 
IV. DOES LEGAL FAMILY MATTER? 
“Legal origins” scholars argue that a country’s legal family 
membership matters and is exogenous. It is immutable, it was chosen 
without regard to its likely economic consequences, and it cabins the 
legal policy choices available to national leaders. By contrast, if the 
legal changes adopted in a country simply depend on the languages 
that legal scholars can most fluently read, then that membership is 
either irrelevant, endogenous, or both. This would seem an 
empirically testable question. 
Suppose that—for reasons inherent in the legal technology of 
codes—countries can neither switch legal families nor borrow across 
family lines. The former French colonies cannot switch to another 
legal family, and their French legal codes prevent them from 
borrowing from any other country. By contrast, suppose Spamann is 
right. If so, then the French colonies borrow from France primarily 
because they read French better than they read either German or 
English. In this latter world, countries could indeed switch families 
 
electoral markets. The answer to Spamann’s puzzle is that countries do not cling to 
inappropriate models. Spamann would have noticed this if he had not constrained his country 
dataset the way he did. 
 17. This point is nicely developed in Daniel Klerman, Paul Mahoney, Holger Spamann 
& Mark Weinstein, Legal Origin and Economic Growth (Apr. 30, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://law.usc.edu/assets/docs/Klerman_Origin.pdf, and Daron 
Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001). 
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or borrow across family lines. If they do not often do so, they stay 
within their family only because it presents all the legal policy 
options they need. 
To test the hypotheses, a scholar must look at countries where 
legal family membership does not correlate with linguistic ties—at 
French-code countries that do not speak French, or German-code 
countries that do not speak German. Take Korea. Koreans may speak 
German no better than French, but they use German codes. 
According to the structuralists, their legal family membership will 
prevent them from switching to the French legal family or adopting 
French statutory measures. Japanese may speak English much better 
than German, but according to the structuralists they will not be able 
to switch to the common law system or adopt U.S. regulatory 
measures. 
By contrast, suppose much legal change simply follows linguistic 
lines. Sometimes, Koreans may decide to borrow from France. 
Scholars with good German ability may study in Frankfurt and cite 
their German peers, but those with better French will go to Paris. In 
turn, Japanese will borrow from the United States. After all, some 
college students still learn German, but everyone studies English. 
Most Japanese scholars will find U.S. articles easier to read than 
German, legislative staffers will find U.S. statutes easier to 
understand, and judges will find U.S. cases easier to cite. Japan may 
sport the German Civil Code, but most Japanese were raised on 
Hollywood and the Beatles. They know English better than German. 
According to the structuralist theory, they will borrow from 
Germany anyway. According to Spamann’s eminently good sense, 
they will borrow from the United States and the U.K. 
V. JAPAN 
Consider Japan a test. Since World War II, it has followed 
American legal developments far more closely than German,18 but 
perhaps some observers will (quite plausibly) attribute this to the 
impact of the American-dominated occupation. To avoid the effect 
of that intervention, consider instead the pre-war period. When 
 
 18. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt, Historical Pathways of Reform: Foreign Law 
Transplants and Japanese Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: 
CORPORATIONS, STATES, AND MARKETS IN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE US 53, 55 (Klaus J. 
Hopt et al. eds., 2005). 
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Japan adopted a western legal system in the late 19th century, it was 
not a colony. Most citizens did not speak any foreign language at all, 
and most firms lacked a history of foreign trade. As a result, for 
testing the impact of legal structure (not language or legal culture, 
but the laws themselves) on legal family changes or legal borrowing 
patterns, pre-war Japan offers a nice example.  
After toying with Chinese legal models, the early government in 
1880 adopted a French-based Criminal Code and Criminal 
Procedure Code.19 For its constitution, it looked to Germany, and in 
1889 adopted a constitution with Prussian roots.20 
SELECTED JAPANESE LAWMAKING 
Year Item Influence
1880 Criminal Code French
1880 Criminal Procedure Code French
1889 Constitution German
1890 Civil Code French
1890 Civil Procedure Code German
1890 Commercial Code Eclectic
1890 Criminal Procedure Code Eclectic
1898 Civil Code (II) German
1899 Commercial Code (II) German
1905 Secured Bonds Trust Act Common Law 
1907 Criminal Code (II) German
1922 Criminal Procedure Code (II) German
1922 Bankruptcy Act German
1922 Trusts Act, Trust Business Act Common Law 
 
The government next turned to the Civil Code, Civil Procedure 
Code, and Commercial Code. In 1890, it passed all three. But where 
it liked the Napoleonic civil code, it preferred German procedural 
and commercial rules. Accordingly, in the same year that it adopted a 
 
 19. See Kichisaburo Nakamura, Keiho [Criminal Code], in 9 KOZA: NIHON KINDAI HO 
HATTATSU SHI [HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY MODERN JAPANESE LAW] 31–61 
(Nobushige Ukai et al. eds., 1960); Atsushi Nagashima, The Accused and Society: The 
Administration of Criminal Justice in Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN 297 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren 
ed., 1963); Kenzo Takayanagi, A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law, 
1868–1961, in LAW IN JAPAN, supra, at 5, 15–17, 18–21. 
 20. DAI NIPPON TEIKOKU KENPO [Great Japanese Imperial Constitution] (1889); see 
Takayanagi, supra note 19, at 6–12. 
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French-based Civil Code,21 it adopted a heavily German Civil 
Procedure Code22 and an eclectic Commercial Code.23 
Simultaneously, it replaced the now ten-year-old French-based 
Criminal Procedure Code with a new, more German statute.24 
Spamann’s claim that “the only legal materials that seem to be able 
to cross legal family lines are those from common law countries”25 is 
not quite true. 
Having begun with French legislation, the Japanese government 
gradually turned to Germany. Facing opposition from some 
conservatives to the Napoleonic code, it redrafted its French Civil 
Code along Germanic lines. By 1898, it had a new code, and 
replaced the 1890 one with a German-based statute.26 It replaced its 
Commercial Code with a second—again Germanic—code in 1899.27 
The government did not just look to France and Germany. In 
1905, it passed an Anglo-Indian trust statute for its budding 
financial industry, and added further common-law trust legislation in 
1922.28 In 1907—after using the French Criminal Code for a 
quarter century—it replaced it with a German-based code.29 The 
earlier French-influenced Criminal Procedure Code, however, it 
kept. Not until 1922 would it swap the French procedural code for a 
German code.30 Instead, for fifteen years it paired a German 
substantive criminal code with a more French-inspired procedural 
framework. 
If legal structure prevents mixing and matching across family 
lines, no one told the Japanese. During the decades before the 
Second World War, the Japanese government drew from each of the 
French, German, and Anglo-American families. Spamann writes 
 
 21. See 1 SAKAE WAGATSUMA, MINPO TAII [OVERVIEW OF CIVIL CODE] 11 (1944); 
Takayanagi, supra note 19, at 27–30. 
 22. See Takayanagi, supra note 19, at 32–33 (describing the Civil Procedure Code); 
Kohji Tanabe, The Process of Litigation: An Experiment with the Adversary System, in LAW IN 
JAPAN, supra note 19, at 73. 
 23. See TERUHISA ISHII & TSUNEO OTORI, GAISETSU SHOHO [COMMERCIAL CODE 
COMMENTARY] 17–18 (1975); Takayanagi, supra note 19, at 31–32. 
 24. See Nagashima, supra note 19, at 297. 
 25. Spamann, supra note 7, at 1861. 
 26. See 1 WAGATSUMA, supra note 21, at 11; Takayanagi, supra note 19, at 30–31. 
 27. See ISHII & OTORI, supra note 23, at 18; Takayanagi, supra note 19, at 31–32. 
 28. See Takayanagi, supra note 19, at 33–34. 
 29. See id. at 17–18. 
 30. See id. at 21–23; Ryuichi Hirano, The Accused and Society: Some Aspects of Japanese 
Criminal Law, in LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 274. 
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“that no country ever fully switched from one legal family to 
another,”31 but in the late nineteenth century Japan seems 
forthrightly to have switched legal families: it began with French 
legal codes in 1880, but by 1940 had adopted German codes. And 
during the intervening decades, it mixed and matched with abandon. 
In 1890, it paired a French-style Civil Code with a more Germanic 
Civil Procedure Code. From 1907 to 1922, it paired a German 
Criminal Code with a French Criminal Procedure Code. And after 
1905, it added an overlay of Anglo-American trust law.32 
This is not a government that knew not what it did. During 
these decades of mix-and-match experimentation, the economy grew 
explosively. From 1870 to 1920, per capita GDP rocketed from 
$737 to $1696.33 Concomitantly, the government amassed 
enormous military power. From its self-imposed (and gun-less, navy-
less) isolation of 1853, it built a military machine that would defeat 
the Czar in 1905, annex Korea in 1910, and begin a ruthless march 
into north China. 
Countries can indeed switch legal families, and thrive. They can 
borrow across family lines, and thrive. Not to put too fine a point on 
it, mixing and matching across legal families works. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The “structural theory” is simply wrong. The initial adoption of 
one set of legal codes does not preclude later switches. Even less 
does it preclude borrowing across legal family lines. 
And if both of those statements be true, then any regression of 
economic performance on legal origin is fundamentally misspecified. 
Countries do not need to stay with a set of legal codes. Instead, they 
decide whether to stay with the economic effect of any potential 
switch in mind; legal structures are therefore endogenous to 
expected economic consequences; and scholars cannot properly 
regress economic performance on legal family membership. Neither 
 
 31. Spamann, supra note 7, at 1865. 
 32. See Takayanagi, supra note 19, at 33–34 (trust legislation). 
 33. See ANGUS MADDISON, STATISTICS ON WORLD POPULATION, GDP AND PER 
CAPITA GDP, 1-2006 A.D., at tbl.3 (2009) (horizontal file), available at 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/. During the same period, per capita French GDP grew 
from $1876 to $3227, and German GDP from $1839 to $2796. Id. Before the start of World 
War I, in 1914, per capita GDP in France was $3236 and in Germany $3059. Id. These 
calculations are measured in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. 
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does legal family membership limit policy options. Instead, countries 
can mix and match statutes across family lines; legal family 
membership does not—logically cannot—seriously constrain legal 
policy; and legal family membership cannot affect economic 
outcomes. 
To be sure, countries do not often switch families. But they 
rarely switch only because doing so would rarely earn them a 
significant benefit. If legal family membership does not constrain 
legal policy, why bother? 
 
